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arXiv · 2608.21393

Spyre-Accelerated Retrieval-Augmented Generation on IBM LinuxONE: A Cloud-Native Architecture for Secure, High-Throughput Enterprise AI Inference

Sandeep Bokkasam·Pankaj D
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Abstract

Running large language models inside enterprise environments has always bumped up against a practical wall: the data lives in one place, the AI horsepower sits somewhere else, and moving sensitive records between the two creates real headaches around latency, security, and regulatory exposure. IBM's Spyre accelerator PCIe inference card built for LinuxONE and the broader IBM Z family changes that equation. In this paper we lay out a six-subsystem RAG architecture that runs entirely on IBM LinuxONE, using Spyre for generative inference, the Telum II on-chip accelerator for lightweight classification tasks, and Red Hat OpenShift for container orchestration. Every piece of the pipeline from query intake through vector retrieval, prompt assembly, LLM inference, compliance filtering, and response delivery stays within a single LinuxONE system, so sensitive data never has to leave the hardware perimeter. We walk through the design choices behind each subsystem, dig into the Spyre compilation and serving stack, explain how LinuxONE's Secure Execution technology extends confidential-computing guarantees to AI workloads, and benchmark the architecture against cloud-GPU and on-premises alternatives. Early analysis points to end-to-end RAG latencies under two seconds and up to a 20x reduction compared to off-platform inference, all while keeping the strong encryption and auditability posture that regulated industries actually need.

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Sandeep Bokkasam, Pankaj D. 2026-08-02. Spyre-Accelerated Retrieval-Augmented Generation on IBM LinuxONE: A Cloud-Native Architecture for Secure, High-Throughput Enterprise AI Inference. https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.21393

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