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arXiv · 2609.01671

Ranked by the Matcher: A Reproducibility Audit of Knowledge Graph Extraction from Threat Reports

Safayat Bin Hakim·Houbing Herbert Song
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Abstract

Security teams and researchers choose knowledge-graph extraction tooling for threat reports on the strength of published triple-F1 scores, yet those scores depend on how predicted triples are matched to gold annotations. We could reimplement the stated matching rule for only five of twelve inspected systems. Re-scoring ten system outputs on shared documents under eight protocols reverses eleven of forty-five pairwise orderings; one fixed prediction set spans 0.16--0.70 F1. On an external, human-adjudicated set, no mechanical matcher---lexical, embedding, or entailment---agrees with the reviewers more than seven times in ten; an LLM judge agrees far more often. To separate component effects from matcher rewards, we build CTIForge, whose deterministic validation layer can vary while extraction is held byte-identical. Across seven tested deployment configurations, no hosted backbone loses precision under validation and every offline one does. Backbone, decoding, and prompting covary across those configurations; on the one backbone we could serve both ways, serving alone reproduces the split. It coincides with a roughly 2.8-fold increase in actions explicitly disputing entity type, consistent with hand-written rules encoding the conventions of the extractor against which they were developed. We release the pipeline, protocol suite, and per-triple audit records.

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Safayat Bin Hakim, Houbing Herbert Song. 2026-09-05. Ranked by the Matcher: A Reproducibility Audit of Knowledge Graph Extraction from Threat Reports. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.01671

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