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arXiv · 2609.04537

Sparse Disapproval Guarantees a Nonempty Hare Core

Jiarui Fang
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Abstract

An approval committee is Hare-core stable if no coalition meeting the Hare quota can strictly improve by moving to another candidate set. Whether every approval election has such a committee remains open. We prove nonemptiness when each voter disapproves at most two candidates, with no bounds on the numbers of candidates, seats, or voter types. The result also permits arbitrary positive rational voter weights. Our deterministic rule represents a committee by its missing set. It first maximizes weighted coverage of two-candidate disapproval sets and then maximizes total disapproval incidence. An exact coverage inequality excludes targets one seat below the committee. The incidence objective excludes unanimous equal-size targets, while targets of size at most $k-2$ cannot improve any voter. Two implementation-level independent verifiers audit overlapping finite grids. The symbolic proof, not this bounded enumeration, establishes the theorem's unbounded quantifiers. The argument identifies complement-side coverage as a tractable mechanism for a broad parameter range within a sharply defined preference domain.

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Jiarui Fang. 2026-09-03. Sparse Disapproval Guarantees a Nonempty Hare Core. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04537

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