Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 2609.07568

We're Cooked! - Probing LLM Political Alignment Via Conflict-Framed Recipe Translation

Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed for translation tasks, yet their implicit political positioning in such contexts remains understudied. We ask whether a single politically charged framing term, such as aggressor, enemy, neighbour, or coloniser is sufficient to trigger implicit political alignment in an otherwise apolitical task. We present a fully crossed factorial study in which eight models spanning Western, Chinese, and European origins are prompted to translate culturally attributed recipes into a target language left deliberately unspecified. Across 17 languages, four framing conditions, eight models, and 15,680 responses, we find that models do not simply decline or ask for clarification but resolve the ambiguity. Language resolution and reasoning behavior cluster meaningfully along model families: Western models hedge and deflect with vague justifications, Chinese models resolve conflicts silently, and Mistral Large emerges as a distinct profile combining high compliance with conflict-grounded reasoning. Sensitivity to framing terms is consistent across models: even subtle framing variation is sufficient to modulate behavior. Our findings urge caution when deploying LLMs for translation in conflict-adjacent contexts, where implicit political judgments may be made without any signal to the user.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

BibTeXRIS

Svetlana Gorovaia, Angelica Henestrosa, Ivan P. Yamshchikov. 2026-09-07. We're Cooked! - Probing LLM Political Alignment Via Conflict-Framed Recipe Translation. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.07568

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

Discover connections

Connections use source metadata and explicit phrase matches, not verified experimental comparisons.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

CyrillicQA: The Influence of Phonetically Encoded Secret Language on LLM Performance

Due to the selection of their training data, large language models (LLMs) perform best on standard-language inputs from languages using the Latin alphabet with large speaker populations, while disadvantaging other language varieties. Nevertheless, they can also be a versatile tool for preserving precisely such endangered languages. But do they also possess the necessary creativity and capacity for abstraction to decode phonetically encoded language the same way humans do?

cs.CL

Good Pretraining, Bad SFT: Checkpoint Quality Across the Training Stack

Language-model checkpoints are commonly selected by pretraining loss or benchmark scores, assuming that the highest-scoring checkpoint will remain the best starting point for subsequent training. We show that this assumption can fail in a full 30B mixture-of-experts training pipeline. The checkpoints that perform better after the full downstream training stack also have higher solution density, i.e., retain downstream performance under local weight perturbations.

cs.AI

When Robots Mishear Us: Mapping the Safety Risks of Voice-Controlled Embodied AI

We investigate whether automatic speech recognition (ASR) errors in user input can lead to unsafe outputs from Embodied AI (EAI) models. We find that ASR errors can lead to harmful instructions being accepted and executed by EAI models, thereby reducing safety. We simulate ASR errors and combine them with existing safety benchmarks (SafeAgentBench and POEX) to evaluate how different errors affect embodied AI safety. We find that some of them preserve semantic structure but increase harmful ambiguity, while others weaken the model refusal behaviour and allow unsafe plans to be generated and executed. We show that in some cases automatic correction of ASR errors can reduce the risk, but this is not always effective. Overall, we show that ASR errors lead to significant safety risks for embodied AI.

cs.AI