arXiv · 2609.26642
The Delegation Blind Spot: Auditing Product Decisions from Agent Choices
Abstract
Successful agent execution need not identify which future product improvement its user would value. We present a decision-specific audit that maps a declared observation channel and product-value contrast to compatible intervals and witness populations. Its foundations are established identification and decision theory; the contribution is an executable measurement workflow and a controlled study of its limits. A frozen experiment makes 4,800 requests to two pinned model snapshots on shared synthetic tasks. All 36 conservative primary intervals remain unresolved despite different execution accuracy. An exploratory 2,400-call follow-up records supplied preferences and resolves three of nine comparisons per model. A deterministic extractor resolves seven of nine without model calls or calibration observations, exposing unnecessary uncertainty introduced by model-generated reports. A further 14,400 controlled multinomial simulations distinguish structural ambiguity from weak identification and finite calibration precision. We propose a source-labeled decision receipt and provide an offline viewer for inspecting the audit. These results motivate preserving decision-relevant structured input and diagnosing why a decision is unresolved before collecting more telemetry. The study contains no human participants or real customer outcomes. Full proofs, raw model provenance, controlled experiments, and reproducible analyses accompany the report.
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Shivam Gupta. 2026-09-22. The Delegation Blind Spot: Auditing Product Decisions from Agent Choices. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26642
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