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arXiv · 2609.28873

Improved Revenue Guarantees for Selling Separately and Bundling

Yang Cai·Vineet Gupta·Yanchen Jiang·Christopher Liaw·Aranyak Mehta·Grigoris Velegkas·Di Wang
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Abstract

We study how much revenue a seller can lose by restricting attention to selling separately or grand bundling, in the setting of a single additive buyer with independent item values. Although revenue-optimal mechanisms can require lotteries and infinite menus, Babaioff, Immorlica, Lucier, and Weinberg showed that the better of these two simple formats always achieves a constant fraction of optimal revenue. We prove that $\mathrm{OPT} \le 3.52 \max\{\mathrm{SREV}, \mathrm{BREV}\}$, where $\mathrm{SREV}$ and $\mathrm{BREV}$ are the optimal revenues from selling separately and grand bundling, respectively. This improves the previous best-known approximation factor of $5.2$ due to Ma and Simchi-Levi and narrows the gap to the known lower bound of $2$.

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Yang Cai, Vineet Gupta, Yanchen Jiang, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Grigoris Velegkas, Di Wang. 2026-09-24. Improved Revenue Guarantees for Selling Separately and Bundling. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.28873

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