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arXiv · 2609.29869

Costly Voting in the Hotelling-Downs Model

Guy Wolf·Reshef Meir
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Abstract

We study a partial-participation variation of the Hotelling-Downs model. Voters each have a cost to vote, and only vote when the comparative gain from their preferred candidate exceeds the cost. Under this model the median voter theorem breaks, and we study the extent of polarization under equilibria in different voters and cost distributions. We find that the main predictor of polarization is the reverse-hazard-rate of the cost distribution, indicating that the driver of polarization under our model is the willingness of voters to respond to changes in positions of candidates. We then extend the model by adding parameters governing alienation and candidate competitiveness, showing that our results are robust even when taking into account other realistic factors.

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Guy Wolf, Reshef Meir. 2026-09-24. Costly Voting in the Hotelling-Downs Model. https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.29869

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