Search arXiv⌕ Search

arXiv · 2610.01834

Code Owns the Simulation, Jev Owns the Evaluation

Abstract

Judgment models such as \jev{} return, in a single call and without reasoning text, a probability for each described option. This makes them attractive as an agent's action-selection layer, but it is unclear which decisions they can be trusted with. We test \jev{} on reflection tests, one-shot matrix games, the text game ALFWorld and robot control, and find a sharp boundary. \jev{} succeeds when the right option can be judged from what the input describes, which we call \emph{evaluation}. Specifically, it solves 99\% of the counterintuitive Cognitive Reflection Test questions. However, it fails when the right option depends on \emph{simulation} (i.e., predicting something not in the input), such as the opponent's action or the subgoal that must come first. In games, \jev{} plays suboptimally as if its rational opponent acted at random, because the opponent's action is not given. In ALFWorld, \jev{} favors commands that mention an object or place named in the task description. For example, given the task ``put a clean knife in the drawer'', \jev{} carries an unwashed knife straight to the drawer instead of first washing it at the sink. Surprisingly, many of these failures are not due to a lack of knowledge. Asked separately what the opponent will do, \jev{} usually answers correctly, and it responds well given the opponent's action. It fails when one call must both perform the simulation and evaluate based on it. This suggests letting code make the prediction or simulation. When code supplies it, such as a lookahead in ALFWorld and physics simulation in robot control, \jev{} becomes an expert controller through its general evaluation ability.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Yaodong Yang, Hongyao Tang, Yi Ma, Xingyu Fan, Weixun Wang, Jinpeng Li, Tianpei Yang. 2026-10-01. Code Owns the Simulation, Jev Owns the Evaluation. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01834

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Reducing Cognitive Overhead in Tool Use via Multi-Small-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Recent advances in multi-agent systems highlight the potential of specialized small agents that collaborate via division of labor. Existing tool-integrated reasoning systems, however, often follow a single-agent paradigm in which one large model interleaves long-horizon reasoning with precise tool operations, leading to cognitive-load interference and unstable coordination. We present MSARL, a Multi-Small-Agent Reinforcement Learning framework that explicitly decouples reasoning from tool use. In MSARL, a Reasoning Agent decomposes problems and plans tool invocations, while multiple Tool Agents specialize in specific external tools, each trained via a combination of imitation learning and reinforcement learning with role-specific rewards. On mathematical problem solving with code execution, MSARL significantly improves reasoning stability and final-answer accuracy over single-agent baselines. Moreover, the architecture generalizes to diverse tool-use tasks, demonstrating that cognitive-role decoupling with small agents is a scalable blueprint for multi-agent AI design.

cs.AI↗

LLM-based Agentic Reasoning Frameworks: A Survey from Methods to Scenarios

Recent advances in LLM-based agents highlight the importance of their reasoning frameworks, which guide the problem-solving process in diverse ways. This survey introduces a unified formal language to systematically categorize these frameworks at three compositional levels: single-agent, tool-based, and multi-agent methods. Following our taxonomy, we review key application scenarios across scientific discovery, healthcare, software engineering, society, economics, and general-purpose tasks. It also compares the distinct features and evaluation strategies of each category. Through our taxonomy and comparisons, our survey explores the designs and strengths of LLM-based agentic frameworks in different scenarios, reviewing the fast-paced development of complex agentic systems in the real world.

cs.AI↗

Moloch's Bargain: Emergent Misalignment When LLMs Compete for Audiences

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly shaping how information is created and disseminated, from companies using them to craft persuasive advertisements, to election campaigns optimizing messaging to gain votes, to social media influencers boosting engagement. These settings are inherently competitive, with sellers, candidates, and influencers vying for audience approval, yet it remains poorly understood how competitive feedback loops influence LLM behavior. We show that optimizing LLMs for competitive success can inadvertently drive misalignment. Using simulated environments across these scenarios, we find that, 6.3% increase in sales is accompanied by a 14.0% rise in deceptive marketing; in elections, a 4.9% gain in vote share coincides with 22.3% more disinformation and 12.5% more populist rhetoric; and on social media, a 7.5% engagement boost comes with 188.6% more disinformation and a 16.3% increase in promotion of harmful behaviors. We call this phenomenon Moloch's Bargain for AI--competitive success achieved at the cost of alignment. These misaligned behaviors emerge even when models are explicitly instructed to remain truthful and grounded, revealing the fragility of current alignment safeguards. Our findings highlight how market-driven optimization pressures can systematically erode alignment, creating a race to the bottom, and suggest that safe deployment of AI systems will require stronger governance and carefully designed incentives to prevent competitive dynamics from undermining societal trust.

cs.AI↗