Not Until the Evidence Says So: Teaching LLM Investigators When to Close a Case

Abstract

Accident, defect and outage investigations end with a decision that ordinary question answering never faces: whether the evidence gathered so far is enough to close the case. We study this decision for LLM investigators, which request evidence from a case file, revise their hypotheses, and either close the case with a conclusion grounded in what they read or leave it open and name what is missing. This judgment does not come with capability: an untrained 9B model overstates its evidence in 97% of its answers, and a frontier model that identifies the right cause in 84% of cases still overstates in 91% and closes 17 of the 41 cases whose official finding is "cause undetermined". Measuring it is also non-trivial: the source of a case largely predicts its label, and a rule that reads only the source reaches 83.0 balanced accuracy on our test cases. We therefore evaluate closure with three tests: closure accuracy, reported against this rule and within each source; evidence dependence, which removes the grounds of a conclusion and checks whether the model stops closing; and conclusion and gap quality, a judged checklist of what the model asserts and what it says is missing. We build Nautil, 731 audited cases from aviation, rail, maritime, chemical-safety and vehicle-defect reports and production server incidents, with teacher trajectories, an out-of-distribution test set and counterfactual evidence versions. Fine-tuning a 9B model on these trajectories makes its closures follow the evidence: removing the grounds lowers its closure rate by 26 points relative to a matched control, overstatement falls from 97% to 35%, and correct, non-overstated conclusions rise from 3% to 43%. Reinforcement learning that rewards only the closure decision then raises balanced accuracy from 69.2 to 83.3, on par with the teacher, and within-source accuracy from 60.4 to 74.1, at some cost in evidence dependence.