Can LLM Agents Select and Engage with Biological Tools?

Abstract

Computational tools for biological research (biological tools, or BTs) are advancing rapidly in both quantity and demonstrated capability. While these technologies offer many benefits for scientific advancement, malicious actors may seek to exploit them to design and develop biological weapons (BWs). Generally, BTs require specialized expertise to operate successfully, presenting a barrier to nefarious use by nonexperts. Large language model (LLM) Agents may erode this barrier by enabling actors with limited domain expertise to successfully use BTs. Assessments of how AI could change bioweapons development pathways should examine how LLM Agents interact with BTs on relevant biological design tasks, but such assessments are limited. In this report, we present an assessment of the abilities of LLM Agents in the early stages of interaction with BTs. First, we evaluate seven frontier LLM Agents on their ability to select appropriate BTs for a given task. Second, we assess how these LLM Agents engage with two BTs, EVEscape and ESM3, through targeted case studies. These case studies probe the enabling capabilities required for autonomous BT operation, a potential entry point to a wide range of risk pathways. We identify and assess technical barriers at the intersection of LLM Agents and BTs, offering the biosecurity community and AI developers a foundation for further risk and capability assessments as technologies progress.