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Kyle Brady

Publications and source records attributed to Kyle Brady.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Can LLM Agents Select and Engage with Biological Tools?

Computational tools for biological research (biological tools, or BTs) are advancing rapidly in both quantity and demonstrated capability. While these technologies offer many benefits for scientific advancement, malicious actors may seek to exploit them to design and develop biological weapons (BWs). Generally, BTs require specialized expertise to operate successfully, presenting a barrier to nefarious use by nonexperts. Large language model (LLM) Agents may erode this barrier by enabling actors with limited domain expertise to successfully use BTs. Assessments of how AI could change bioweapons development pathways should examine how LLM Agents interact with BTs on relevant biological design tasks, but such assessments are limited. In this report, we present an assessment of the abilities of LLM Agents in the early stages of interaction with BTs. First, we evaluate seven frontier LLM Agents on their ability to select appropriate BTs for a given task. Second, we assess how these LLM Agents engage with two BTs, EVEscape and ESM3, through targeted case studies. These case studies probe the enabling capabilities required for autonomous BT operation, a potential entry point to a wide range of risk pathways. We identify and assess technical barriers at the intersection of LLM Agents and BTs, offering the biosecurity community and AI developers a foundation for further risk and capability assessments as technologies progress.

cs.CY↗

Testing Large Language Model Agents on the Use of Biological Tools for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening Evasion

This report is a continuation of previous efforts to test the ability of large language model (LLM)-driven artificial intelligence (AI) agents to interface with AI-enabled biological tools (BTs). While rapid advancements in BTs in recent years have brought promise to accelerate scientific discovery, they also raise significant biosecurity concerns about potential misuse. The biosecurity community is particularly interested in the extent to which LLMs can lower technical barriers and assist non-expert users in accessing and operating BTs. Despite this interest, few evaluations have focused on LLM-BT interactions in the context of a defined threat model. To address this gap, this report describes a test of frontier LLM-driven AI Agents on their ability to use BTs to redesign peptides and proteins to evade nucleic acid synthesis screening measures. Highly relevant to biorisk, this task assesses a potential capability of AI agents that could enable a breach of a critical early defensive layer designed to prevent a multitude of biological misuse scenarios. The findings presented here intend to offer a foundation for biosecurity researchers and AI developers to conduct or further risk and capability assessments as these technologies progress.

cs.CY↗

Measuring Biological Capabilities and Risks of AI Agents

This paper addresses a rapidly emerging policy challenge: how to generate and interpret credible evidence about the biological capabilities and risks of AI scientists, or agentic AI systems capable of autonomously or collaboratively performing multi-step scientific tasks. As these systems enter real research workflows, decision-makers increasingly face evaluation results whose meaning depends on underlying design choices that are often implicit or under-documented. We synthesize current evidence on AI-enabled biological risks and introduce biological agentic evaluations as a promising, but interpretation-sensitive, tool for assessing these systems. Our central contribution is a set of practical, experience-grounded considerations -- drawing from our own evaluations -- that show how choices around defining, designing, running, scoring, and documenting evaluations materially shape what results do and do not imply about risk. The analysis is intended to help policymakers interpret biological evaluation outputs with appropriate caution; guide public and private funders toward high-leverage investments in AI-biology evaluation research; and support biosecurity practitioners assessing emerging AI systems. A secondary audience includes researchers designing or conducting agentic evaluations within frontier AI labs, AI providers, scientific institutions, and third-party evaluation organizations.

cs.CY↗