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arXiv · 2610.06262

Coexistence of Shill-Proof and Non-Shill-Proof Equilibria in a Public Auction

Benjamin Marsh
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Abstract

A single auction can have both a shill-proof equilibrium and a non-shill-proof equilibrium in the model of Komo, Kominers, and Roughgarden. We give an explicit single item example with three bidder positions, publicly observed actions, positive winning prices, and a strictly regular i.i.d.\ value distribution. Real bidders have strict incentives in both equilibria. An initial public action conveys information about whether the final position is real. The resulting belief changes the middle bidder's response and reverses the first shill's strict preference between two actions. We verify both equilibria and compute their expected revenues.

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Benjamin Marsh. 2026-10-05. Coexistence of Shill-Proof and Non-Shill-Proof Equilibria in a Public Auction. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.06262

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