On the Fragility of Efficiency: Uncoupled Learning with a Deviant

Abstract

An important question in learning in games is whether players can learn to achieve efficient outcomes, those that maximize the sum of their utilities, without communication or coordination. Completely uncoupled learning algorithms, which use only each player's own past actions and utilities, can guarantee this in broad classes of games, but they typically require every player to follow the same algorithm. In this work, we ask whether one can design welfare-maximizing learning algorithms that are robust to a deviant player. To study this question, we take a well-studied welfare-maximizing learning algorithm as a testbed and consider what happens when every player except one follows it. First, we consider a deviant player who either (i) always plays the same action or (ii) selects their action uniformly at random. We show that such a player can significantly alter the long-run behavior of this algorithm, leading to states that are far from welfare-maximizing, and that no completely uncoupled learning algorithm is robust to such a player in every game. Next, we consider a strategic deviant player who acts in their own interest and show that this player can adopt a different learning algorithm to shift the long-run outcome in their favor. Moreover, we show that under any completely uncoupled welfare-maximizing learning algorithm, there is a game in which some player benefits from switching to a different completely uncoupled learning algorithm. These results show that completely uncoupled welfare-maximizing learning is fragile, even to a single deviant player, suggesting that robustness may require communication or coordination.