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arXiv · 2610.19699

Effective-Balance Design in Ethereum Proof-of-Stake

Bolin Zhang·Xuechao Wang
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Abstract

Proof-of-Stake (PoS) systems offer a scalable and energy-efficient alternative to Proof-of-Work (PoW). The economic security of PoS relies critically on incentivizing broad and meaningful participation through well-cali\-brated staking reward mechanisms. We study Ethe\-reum's effective-balance rules as a mechanism-design problem in which the protocol chooses a reward coefficient, an activation threshold, and a maximum effective balance, and validators respond in the induced propor\-tional-allocation game. For fixed participating validators and identity counts, we establish a unique Nash equilibrium in validator-level total stakes. When validators can split or merge their visible identities, each candidate identity structure must be evaluated after the market re-clears. Restructuring incentives therefore depend on post-reset payoff comparisons that account for all validators' stake responses. For an illustrative simulation, we construct address-level budget proxies from Beacon Chain deposits and withdrawals, Lido staking flows, Etherscan balances, and calibrated synthetic agents. With illustrative cost coefficients, lowering the reserve price from 32 ETH to 30 ETH increases active identities by 5.922\% and total effective stake by 0.098\%.

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Bolin Zhang, Xuechao Wang. 2026-10-14. Effective-Balance Design in Ethereum Proof-of-Stake. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.19699

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