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arXiv · 2610.27839

Extending Mechanisms

Sergiu Hart·Noam Nisan
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Abstract

Given an incentive-compatible mechanism for a single agent on a restricted domain of valuations, we consider its incentive-compatible extensions to the entire valuation space. We identify two extreme extensions: the "keep-the-menu" extension, which minimizes buyer payoffs and maximizes canonical prices pointwise, and the "keep-the-pricing" extension, which maximizes buyer payoffs and minimizes canonical prices pointwise.

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Sergiu Hart, Noam Nisan. 2026-10-20. Extending Mechanisms. https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.27839

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