Discrete Choice under Congestion: Equilibrium and Welfare

Debopam Bhattacharya; Matias Makiranta

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arXiv · 2611.07787

Discrete Choice under Congestion: Equilibrium and Welfare

Debopam Bhattacharya·Matias Makiranta

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Abstract

In many choice settings, a rise in aggregate demand for an option lowers an individual's payoff from choosing it. Driving becomes less attractive than taking a train when more commuters drive, clogging the highway. In such cases, a targeted intervention that mitigates the externality at the congested option can divert it elsewhere and also undermine preference based sorting, making overall welfare effects theoretically ambiguous. We develop an empirical framework to analyze such scenarios of endogenous congestion. We show that in these settings, equilibrium exists and is unique without restrictions on functional-form of utilities or dimension/distribution of preference heterogeneity, and even when congestion at one option affects payoffs from other choices. Under a linear-index structure, micro-data on choice enables semiparametric identification of utility contrasts and welfare effects of some, but not all, interventions. We apply the framework to Cambridge undergraduate admissions, where candidates apply through one constituent college, and admission probability depends on application numbers relative to capacity in that college. Using administrative micro-data on 25,325 applicants, we calculate welfare under two counterfactuals: (i) centralized random allocation and (ii) higher rent at popular colleges. Random allocation reduces welfare for everyone: it removes individual choice without improving admission chances since, by design, lower congestion at a college exactly counterbalances the lower probability of being allocated there. Targeted rent increase produces both gains and losses, with median loss for men and median gain for women. This exercise shows how identified preferences and equilibrium feedback jointly determine welfare when choices entail externalities.

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Debopam Bhattacharya, Matias Makiranta. 2026-11-05. Discrete Choice under Congestion: Equilibrium and Welfare. https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07787

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