Search arXiv⌕ Search

arXiv · 2611.09699

Verifier Noise Is a Temperature: Testing Tilt Predictions in Finite-Budget LLM-Guided Search

Abstract

LLM-guided search loops propose a modified candidate, score it, and keep it if it scores better. When both candidates are re-scored at every comparison, as in the minibatch acceptance gates of prompt optimizers, keep-if-better is a reversible Markov chain if the score difference is logistic and the mutation operator is reversible, and its stationary law is the mutation equilibrium tilted by exp(beta f). For any continuous symmetric noise difference the same tilt is the stationary law of a small-step diffusion limit, with beta = 4F'(0); for a minibatch gate beta grows with the square root of the minibatch size. Caching the incumbent's score instead inflates the recorded score. We test the tilt as a prediction for LLM-guided program search, committing each prediction from calibration data before the search runs. The level after 150 steps rises with the minibatch size in six of seven settings, but its predicted value fails: on bin packing, search attains 62-88% of the predicted gain when the proposer edits the parent and 109-119% when it writes new heuristics. The attained fraction falls with the parent-child quality correlation of unselected mutation; a registered test on two new settings confirmed the direction, but not the quantitative agreement after a correction. Further registered tests found that runs started from a good program kept losing quality over 300 steps, more so from starts that search had selected, by a margin that passed its registered rule narrowly. Runs from different starts had not reached a common level, so whether the tilt describes the stationary law of LLM editing remains open. A registered test in prompt optimisation on frozen task-model scores failed: search exceeded the tilt, and the bin-packing relation did not transfer.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Xiaomeng Li. 2026-11-06. Verifier Noise Is a Temperature: Testing Tilt Predictions in Finite-Budget LLM-Guided Search. https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09699

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

A Theoretical Bridge Between Long-Tailed Recognition and Continual Learning

We theoretically and empirically establish a previously unexplored connection between Long-Tailed Recognition (LTR) and Continual Learning (CL). Specifically, we show that training on a long-tailed dataset with imbalance factor $\mathrm{IF}$ drives model parameters into an $O(1/\sqrt{\mathrm{IF}})$ neighborhood of the dominant-class solution, under both uniform and exponentially decaying cardinality distributions. Building on this result, we establish an objective-level reformulation of LTR as a sequential learning problem and prove that the CL objective upper-bounds the balanced LTR loss up to a constant determined by the residual Head loss. Motivated by this connection, we introduce Continual Learning for Long-Tailed Recognition (CLTR), a principled framework that leverages standard off-the-shelf CL methods to sequentially learn Head and Tail classes while mitigating catastrophic forgetting. Extensive experiments on CIFAR100-LT, CIFAR10-LT, ImageNet-LT, and Caltech256 validate our theoretical predictions and demonstrate strong performance across diverse LTR benchmarks. In the foundation-model regime, CLTR with DualPrompt on a CLIP backbone outperforms standard adaptation baselines and is competitive with specialized methods using external semantic supervision. Our work bridges LTR and CL both theoretically and empirically, providing a principled approach for addressing long-tailed learning using standard CL strategies.

cs.LG↗

TRAM: Test-Time Risk Adaptation with Mixture of Agents

Deployed reinforcement learning agents often face safety requirements that are specified only after training: new hazard maps, revised risk thresholds, or behavioral alignment constraints. We study zero-update deployment-time adaptation in which a fixed library of risk-neutral source policies must be reused under a newly specified reward-risk tradeoff. We propose TRAM (Test-time Risk Adaptation with Mixture of Agents), a source-scored composition rule that evaluates each source under the target reward and an occupancy-based deployment risk, then selects actions using risk-adjusted source scores. Unlike training-time risk-sensitive methods tied to a fixed surrogate such as return variance, TRAM supports spatial barrier exposure, divergence to a reference behavior, and local volatility risks specified at test time. We make the surrogate nature of the method explicit: TRAM is not claimed to solve the full occupancy-control problem of the stitched policy, but it admits a measurable source-hull mismatch term connecting source-scored risk to realized risk. Experiments in gridworlds, MuJoCo Reacher, Safety-Gymnasium, and an inference-time LLM alignment setting show that TRAM improves deployment risk while preserving reward and requires no parameter updates at test time.

cs.LG↗

Towards the Worst-case Robustness of Large Language Models

Recent studies have revealed the vulnerability of large language models to adversarial attacks, where adversaries craft specific inputs to induce incorrect or harmful outputs. Although various empirical defenses have been proposed, their worst-case robustness remains poorly understood, raising concerns about how they would behave against stronger future attacks. Here, we study the worst-case robustness of LLMs from both empirical and theoretical perspectives. First, we provide tighter empirical upper bounds for the tested deterministic defenses using stronger white-box attacks, under which most tested configurations achieve nearly 0\% robustness. Second, we formulate randomized-smoothing certification for bounded and binary base functions as fractional and 0-1 knapsack problems, respectively, and derive grouped solvers for two token kernels. For example, on AdvBench, we certify a GPT-4o safety detector smoothed by a uniform kernel to an average certified $\ell_0$ radius of 2.02. In our stated suffix-attack setting, the same kernel certifies a Llama-3-8B safety detector to an average certified radius of 6.41.

cs.LG↗