arXiv subjects

Martina Vanelli

Publications and source records attributed to Martina Vanelli.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Local Identifiability of Networks with Nonlinear Node Dynamics

We study the identifiability of nonlinear network systems with partial excitation and partial measurement when the network dynamics is linear on the edges and nonlinear on the nodes. We assume that the graph topology and the nonlinear functions at the node level are known, and we aim to identify the weight matrix of the graph. Our main result is that, for almost all static analytic nonlinearities that cross the origin, directed graphs are generically locally identifiable if and only if at least one node is excited in every source component of the condensation graph and at least one node is measured in every sink component. This holds even when all other nodes remain unexcited and unmeasured and stands in sharp contrast to most findings on network identifiability requiring measurement and/or excitation of each node. The result applies to homogeneous feed-forward and recurrent artificial neural networks and generalizes previous literature by considering a broader class of activations and architectures.

math.OC↗

arXiv2026

Interpolation Conditions for Instant Data Consistency with Port-Hamiltonian Structure

We develop a data-driven framework for nonlinear port-Hamiltonian (pH) systems based on interpolation conditions to characterize consistency between observed data and structured dynamical models. Specifically, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a pH system with a smooth (convex) Hamiltonian instantly consistent with a given dataset, without requiring explicit parametrization. We further provide a semidefinite programming formulation to verify consistency with non-degenerate interconnection and dissipation structures. Our results provide a principled approach to assess instant data consistency with physical structure and pave the way for control design directly from data.

math.OC↗

arXiv2026

Equilibria in Network Constrained Markets with System Operator

We study a networked economic system composed of $n$ producers supplying a single homogeneous good to a number of geographically separated markets and of a centralized authority, called the market maker. Producers compete à la Cournot, by choosing the quantities of good to supply to each market they have access to in order to maximize their profit. Every market is characterized by its inverse demand functions returning the unit price of the considered good as a function of the total available quantity. Markets are interconnected by a dispatch network through which quantities of the considered good can flow within finite capacity constraints and possibly satisfying additional linear physical constraints. Such flows are determined by the action of a system operator, who aims at maximizing a designated welfare function. We model such competition as a strategic game with $n+1$ players: the producers and the system operator. For this game, we first establish the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria under standard concavity assumptions. We then identify sufficient conditions for the game to be exact potential with an essentially unique Nash equilibrium. Next, we present a general result that connects the optimal action of the system operator with the capacity constraints imposed on the network. For the commonly used Walrasian welfare, our finding proves a connection between capacity bottlenecks in the market network and the emergence of price differences between markets separated by saturated lines. This phenomenon is frequently observed in real-world scenarios, for instance in power networks. Finally, we validate the model with data from the Italian day-ahead electricity market.

cs.GT↗