Search and Matching without Reciprocity
We study equilibrium sorting in the canonical search-and-matching model with Nash bargaining and ex-ante and ex-post heterogeneity. Under standard conditions for assortative matching under search, match surplus retains two properties of Becker's frictionless benchmark---single-crossing and single-peakedness---but necessarily loses the third, reciprocity. Instead, search generates consensus: intervals of types share the same surplus-maximizing partner. For such intervals, mismatched pairs are more likely to match, conditional on meeting, than perfectly assortative ones. Two forces drive this: with search, outside options rise less than one-for-one with productivity and fall more for agents with fewer suitable partners. Globally, upper contour sets of the match-probability surface are lattices below an endogenous threshold but almost never above it. This means that MLRP fails for some log-concave survival function.