arXiv · 1811.02446
Knowledge and Blameworthiness
Abstract
Blameworthiness of an agent or a coalition of agents is often defined in terms of the principle of alternative possibilities: for the coalition to be responsible for an outcome, the outcome must take place and the coalition should have had a strategy to prevent it. In this article we argue that in the settings with imperfect information, not only should the coalition have had a strategy, but it also should have known that it had a strategy, and it should have known what the strategy was. The main technical result of the article is a sound and complete bimodal logic that describes the interplay between knowledge and blameworthiness in strategic games with imperfect information.
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Pavel Naumov, Jia Tao. 2018-11-05. Knowledge and Blameworthiness. https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.02446
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