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arXiv · 2106.15961

On Tree Equilibria in Max-Distance Network Creation Games

Qian Wang
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Abstract

We study the Nash equilibrium and the price of anarchy in the max-distance network creation game. Network creation game, first introduced and studied by Fabrikant et al., is a classic model for real-world networks from a game-theoretic point of view. In a network creation game with n selfish vertex agents, each vertex can build undirected edges incident to a subset of the other vertices. The goal of every agent is to minimize its creation cost plus its usage cost, where the creation cost is the unit edge cost $α$ times the number of edges it builds, and the usage cost is the sum of distances to all other agents in the resulting network. The max-distance network creation game, introduced and studied by Demaine et al., is a key variant of the original game, where the usage cost takes into account the maximum distance instead. The main result of this paper shows that for $α> 19$ all equilibrium graphs in the max-distance network creation game must be trees, while the best bound in previous work is $α> 129$. We also improve the constant upper bound on the price of anarchy to 3 for tree equilibria. Our work brings new insights into the structure of Nash equilibria and takes one step forward in settling the so-called tree conjecture in the max-distance network creation game.

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Qian Wang. 2022-07-11. On Tree Equilibria in Max-Distance Network Creation Games. https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.15961

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