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arXiv · 2305.07970

The Machine Psychology of Cooperation: Can GPT models operationalise prompts for altruism, cooperation, competitiveness and selfishness in economic games?

Abstract

We investigated the capability of the GPT-3.5 large language model (LLM) to operationalize natural language descriptions of cooperative, competitive, altruistic, and self-interested behavior in two social dilemmas: the repeated Prisoners Dilemma and the one-shot Dictator Game. Using a within-subject experimental design, we used a prompt to describe the task environment using a similar protocol to that used in experimental psychology studies with human subjects. We tested our research question by manipulating the part of our prompt which was used to create a simulated persona with different cooperative and competitive stances. We then assessed the resulting simulacras' level of cooperation in each social dilemma, taking into account the effect of different partner conditions for the repeated game. Our results provide evidence that LLMs can, to some extent, translate natural language descriptions of different cooperative stances into corresponding descriptions of appropriate task behaviour, particularly in the one-shot game. There is some evidence of behaviour resembling conditional reciprocity for the cooperative simulacra in the repeated game, and for the later version of the model there is evidence of altruistic behaviour. Our study has potential implications for using LLM chatbots in task environments that involve cooperation, e.g. using chatbots as mediators and facilitators in public-goods negotiations.

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BibTeXRIS

Steve Phelps, Yvan I. Russell. 2023-05-13. The Machine Psychology of Cooperation: Can GPT models operationalise prompts for altruism, cooperation, competitiveness and selfishness in economic games?. https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.07970

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