Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 2307.05953

Reward Selection with Noisy Observations

Abstract

We study a fundamental problem in optimization under uncertainty. There are $n$ boxes; each box $i$ contains a hidden reward $x_i$. Rewards are drawn i.i.d. from an unknown distribution $\mathcal{D}$. For each box $i$, we see $y_i$, an unbiased estimate of its reward, which is drawn from a Normal distribution with known standard deviation $σ_i$ (and an unknown mean $x_i$). Our task is to select a single box, with the goal of maximizing our reward. This problem captures a wide range of applications, e.g. ad auctions, where the hidden reward is the click-through rate of an ad. Previous work in this model [BKMR12] proves that the naive policy, which selects the box with the largest estimate $y_i$, is suboptimal, and suggests a linear policy, which selects the box $i$ with the largest $y_i - c \cdot σ_i$, for some $c > 0$. However, no formal guarantees are given about the performance of either policy (e.g., whether their expected reward is within some factor of the optimal policy's reward). In this work, we prove that both the naive policy and the linear policy are arbitrarily bad compared to the optimal policy, even when $\mathcal{D}$ is well-behaved, e.g. has monotone hazard rate (MHR), and even under a "small tail" condition, which requires that not too many boxes have arbitrarily large noise. On the flip side, we propose a simple threshold policy that gives a constant approximation to the reward of a prophet (who knows the realized values $x_1, \dots, x_n$) under the same "small tail" condition. We prove that when this condition is not satisfied, even an optimal clairvoyant policy (that knows $\mathcal{D}$) cannot get a constant approximation to the prophet, even for MHR distributions, implying that our threshold policy is optimal against the prophet benchmark, up to constants.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Kamyar Azizzadenesheli, Trung Dang, Aranyak Mehta, Alexandros Psomas, Qian Zhang. 2023-07-12. Reward Selection with Noisy Observations. https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.05953

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Robust Information Design with Heterogeneous Beliefs in Bayesian Congestion Games

In many engineered systems, agents make decisions under incomplete information, creating opportunities for a planner to influence decentralized behavior through signaling. We study how such signaling can be designed in parallel-network, affine latency congestion games when users may not interpret recommendations using the same beliefs assumed by the planner. To do so, we consider Bayesian congestion games with private recommendations and formulate a robust information design problem in which obedience must hold uniformly over a neighborhood of a nominal prior. This addresses the previously uncharacterized issue of whether obedience itself remains reliable under belief heterogeneity, rather than only under the single prior used at the design stage. We characterize policy-level robustness radii, identify regimes in which the robust obedience region remains nonempty, and analyze the resulting robustness--performance tradeoff through a robust value function whose optimal cost is monotone in the robustness requirement and whose local sensitivity is governed by the active obedience constraints.

cs.GT

Core stability recognition for minimum-cost spanning tree games: Parameterized perspective

Minimum-cost spanning tree game (MSTG) is a cooperative game played on an undirected edge-weighted graph $(G,w)$ representing the network, where each vertex corresponds to a player and each edge has an associated cost~$w$. A distinguished vertex $s \in V(G)$ represents the supply or source. For any coalition of players $S$, the characteristic cost function $c(S)$ is defined as the minimum cost of a spanning tree with respect to $w$, connecting exactly the vertices in $S \cup \{s\}$. In this paper we study the computational complexity of deciding core membership for MSTG. In general, deciding whether a given allocation is in the core is \textsf{coNP}-hard~(Faigle et al.,International Journal of Game Theory,1997). We study the core recognition problem under the name {\sc MSTG Core Non-Membership}. We extend the hardness to graphs which are very close to being planar. On the positive side, we present several algorithmic results within the framework of parameterized complexity. We show that {\sc MSTG Core Non-Membership} is fixed-parameter tractable when parameterized by the support size of the allocation. Turning into structural parameters of graphs, we show that the problem admits an FPT algorithm parameterized by treewidth and signed neighborhood diversity. Last but not least, we investigate kernelization. While in general graphs, under standard complexity-theoretical assumptions, {\sc MSTG Core Non-Membership} does not admit a polynomial kernel parameterized by the vertex cover number, we design a cubic kernel in planar graphs. Furthermore, in general graphs, we obtain quadratic kernel for signed neighborhood diversity and linear kernel for the parameter feedback edge number.

cs.GT

Condorcet-type properties of the linear ordering problem with ties

The Kemeny rule aggregates multiple strict rankings into a single strict ranking that minimizes the sum of its distances from the input rankings. The resulting optimization problem, called the Kemeny problem (\texttt{KP}), is a special case of the linear ordering problem (\texttt{LOP}). The Kemeny rule satisfies several desirable properties in social choice theory, including the extended Condorcet criterion (\texttt{XCC}). Ando et al. strengthened this result by introducing the strong Condorcet criterion (\texttt{SCC}) and showing that it holds for every optimal solution to an arbitrary \texttt{LOP} instance. Yoo and Escobedo extended the Kemeny rule to rankings with ties and showed that the resulting rule satisfies the non-strict extended Condorcet criterion (\texttt{NXCC}). This criterion gives a condition under which one candidate must be ranked strictly above another in every optimal solution. In this paper, we introduce the non-strict strong Condorcet criterion (\texttt{NSCC}), a counterpart of the \texttt{SCC} for rankings with ties, and show that it holds for every optimal solution to an arbitrary instance of the linear ordering problem with ties (\texttt{LOPT}). We also establish a complementary structural property that gives conditions under which two candidates must be tied in every optimal solution to an arbitrary \texttt{LOPT} instance.

cs.GT