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arXiv · 2506.06058

Microgrids Coalitions for Energy Market Balancing

Viorica Chifu·Cristina Bianca Pop·Tudor Cioara·Ionut Anghel
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Abstract

With the integration of renewable sources in electricity distribution networks, the need to develop intelligent mechanisms for balancing the energy market has arisen. In the absence of such mechanisms, the energy market may face imbalances that can lead to power outages, financial losses or instability at the grid level. In this context, the grouping of microgrids into optimal coalitions that can absorb energy from the market during periods of surplus or supply energy to the market during periods of is a key aspect in the efficient management of distribution networks. In this article, we propose a method that identify an optimal microgrids coalition capable of addressing the dynamics of the energy market. The proposed method models the problem of identifying the optimal coalition as an optimization problem that it solves by combining a strategy inspired by cooperative game theory with a memetic algorithm. An individual is represented as a coalition of microgrids and the evolution of population of individuals over generations is assured by recombination and mutation. The fitness function is defined as the difference between the total value generated by the coalition and a penalty applied to the coalition when the energy traded by coalition exceeds the energy available/demanded on/by the energy market. The value generated by the coalition is calculated based on the profit obtained by the collation if it sells energy on the market during periods of deficit or the savings obtained by the coalition if it buys energy on the market during periods of surplus and the costs associated with the trading process. This value is divided equitably among the coalition members, according to the Shapley value, which considers the contribution of each one to the formation of collective value.

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Viorica Chifu, Cristina Bianca Pop, Tudor Cioara, Ionut Anghel. 2025-06-06. Microgrids Coalitions for Energy Market Balancing. https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.06058

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