Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 2510.13261

A Ratio-Based Shapley Value for Collaborative Machine Learning - Extended Version

Abstract

Collaborative machine learning enables multiple data owners to jointly train models for improved predictive performance. However, ensuring incentive compatibility and fair contribution-based rewards remains a critical challenge. Prior work by Sim and colleagues (Rachel Hwee Ling Sim et al: Collaborative machine learning with incentive-aware model rewards. In: International conference on machine learning. PMLR. 2020, pp. 8927-8963) addressed this by allocating model rewards, which are non-monetary and freely replicable, based on the Shapley value of each party's data contribution, measured via information gain. In this paper, we introduce a ratio-based Shapley value that replaces the standard additive formulation with a relative contribution measure. While our overall reward framework, including the incentive definitions and model-reward setting, remains aligned with that of Sim and colleagues, the underlying value function is fundamentally different. Our alternative valuation induces a different distribution of model rewards and offers a new lens through which to analyze incentive properties. We formally define the ratio-based value and prove that it satisfies the same set of incentive conditions as the additive formulation, including adapted versions of fairness, individual rationality, and stability. Like the original approach, our method faces the same fundamental trade-offs between these incentives. Our contribution is a mathematically grounded alternative to the additive Shapley framework, potentially better suited to contexts where proportionality among contributors is more meaningful than additive differences.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

BibTeXRIS

Björn Filter, Ralf Möller, Özgür Lütfü Özçep. 2025-10-15. A Ratio-Based Shapley Value for Collaborative Machine Learning - Extended Version. https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.13261

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

MMS Allocation for Chores with Online Agent Arrivals

We study the fair allocation of $m$ indivisible chores to $n$ agents with subadditive cost functions arriving online in an arbitrary order. Upon an agent's arrival, we are informed of her cost function and must irrevocably assign her a set of chores. We focus on the Maximin Share (MMS) fairness notion and aim to compute an allocation in which all items are assigned, and no agent incurs a cost more than $\alpha$ times her MMS. Without any prior information about the instance (other than $n$ and $m$), we design an algorithm with a competitive ratio of $O(\min\{n, k\log^{1+\epsilon}k, \log m\})$ for any constant $\epsilon > 0$, where $k$ denotes the number of cost function types. Our bound matches the best known offline approximation guarantees for MMS under subadditive costs and is nearly optimal with respect to all three parameters: we show that even for binary additive cost functions, no online algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio of $o(\min\{n, k\log k, \log m\})$. We then consider the setting in which the $k$ cost function types are known in advance (though the realized types of arriving agents are not). For additive cost functions, we provide an algorithm with a competitive ratio of $O(\min\{\log k, \log(kn)/\log\log(kn)\})$, and show that constant-competitive algorithms do not exist for general $k$, even for the binary additive setting. For binary additive functions when $k \le n$, we propose a $3$-competitive algorithm and establish a lower bound of $2$.

cs.GT

Truncated Noisy Best-Response Algorithms: Toward Game Theoretic Learning with Safety Guarantees

We consider a game theoretic approach to solve multi-agent coordination problems with submodular maximization objectives. It is known for such problems that the Nash equilibria for the corresponding game are always within 50% of the optimal, but that the equilibria which achieve this worst-case bound are not stable. To exploit this instability, we propose a family of algorithms which we call Truncated Noisy Best-Response (TNBR) Algorithms. These algorithms are flexibly characterized by agents asynchronously and stochastically selecting actions from a neighbourhood of their best response payoffs. We compute bounds on the recurrent classes of TNBR algorithms' associated Markov chains. Our bounds fall into two categories: first, "Performance" bounds ensure that TNBR algorithms always have a high-value recurrent state; second, "Safety" bounds ensure that TNBR algorithms never have arbitrarily-bad recurrent states. Furthermore, these two types of bounds are linked by a waterbed-like effect: every game with a poor Safety guarantee necessarily has a favorable Performance guarantee.

cs.GT

Existence of the Core in Approval-Based Committee Elections

We settle the main open question in the theory of approval-based multi-winner elections: we show that there always exists a committee in the core. The core is a stability and group fairness concept. The proof introduces a new voting rule that optimizes an entropy-like objective function over committees and payment systems. All local optima of this objective function lie in the core, which implies that a core committee can be found in polynomial time.

cs.GT