Search arXiv⌕ Search
Home/Archive/arXiv

arXiv · 2605.19521

Efficient Elicitation of Collective Disagreements

Mohamed Ouaguenouni·Felipe Garrido-Lucero·Umberto Grandi·César Hidalgo·Magdalena Tydrichova
View original source ↗Read source document ↗Export metadata ↓

Abstract

We analyze the structure of the disagreement among a population of voters over a set of alternatives. Surveys typically ask either for pairwise comparisons, simple and intuitive for participants, or full rankings over alternatives, eliciting the entire voters' preferences. Building on the observation that pairwise comparisons cannot distinguish structural disagreement from noise, we propose a stratified framework to identify the minimal aggregated preference information needed to compute a number of disagreement measures from the literature. Specifically, we introduce the plurality matrix, a generalization of pairwise comparisons that records, for every subset $S$ of alternatives, the probability that each $a \in S$ ranks first in $S$. We define the level of a disagreement measure as the smallest subset size needed to express it, showing that many existing notions, including rank-variance and divisiveness, sit at level $3$, proving that pairwise comparisons are not enough. In addition, we demonstrate the interest of going beyond level $3$ both theoretically and experimentally. To make these results actionable, we design two elicitation protocols to estimate the plurality matrix, exploring the trade-off between the number of required participants and the cognitive load requested to each of them.

Explore related subjects

cs.AIcs.GT

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Mohamed Ouaguenouni, Felipe Garrido-Lucero, Umberto Grandi, César Hidalgo, Magdalena Tydrichova. 2026-05-19. Efficient Elicitation of Collective Disagreements. https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.19521

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

arXiv2026

InterPol: De-anonymizing LM Arena via Interpolated Preference Learning

Strict anonymity of model responses is a key for the reliability of voting-based leaderboards, such as LM Arena. While prior studies have attempted to compromise this assumption using simple statistical features like TF-IDF or bag-ofwords, these methods often lack the discriminative power to distinguish between stylistically similar or within-family models. To overcome these limitations and expose the severity of vulnerability, we introduce INTERPOL, a model-driven identification framework that learns to distinguish target models from others using interpolated preference data. Specifically, INTERPOL captures deep stylistic patterns that superficial statistical features miss by synthesizing hard negative samples through model interpolation and employing an adaptive curriculum learning strategy. Extensive experiments demonstrate that INTERPOL significantly outperforms existing baselines in identification accuracy. Furthermore, we quantify the real-world threat of our findings through ranking manipulation simulations on Arena battle data.

cs.AI↗
arXiv2026

Preregistered Belief Revision Contracts

Deliberative multi-agent systems allow agents to exchange messages and revise beliefs over time. While this interaction is meant to improve performance, it can also create dangerous conformity effects: agreement, confidence, prestige, or majority size may be treated as if they were evidence, producing high-confidence convergence to false conclusions. To address this, we introduce PBRC (Preregistered Belief Revision Contracts), a protocol-level mechanism that strictly separates open communication from admissible epistemic change. A PBRC contract publicly fixes first-order evidence triggers, admissible revision operators, a priority rule, and a fallback policy. A non-fallback step is accepted only when it cites a preregistered trigger and provides a nonempty witness set of externally validated evidence tokens. This ensures that every substantive belief change is both enforceable by a router and auditable after the fact. In this paper, (a) we prove that under evidential contracts with conservative fallback, social-only rounds cannot increase confidence and cannot generate purely conformity-driven wrong-but-sure cascades. (b) We show that auditable trigger protocols admit evidential PBRC normal forms that preserve belief trajectories and canonicalized audit traces. (c) We demonstrate that sound enforcement yields epistemic accountability: any change of top hypothesis is attributable to a concrete validated witness set. For token-invariant contracts, (d) we prove that enforced trajectories depend only on token-exposure traces; under flooding dissemination, these traces are characterized exactly by truncated reachability, giving tight diameter bounds for universal evidence closure. Finally, we introduce a companion contractual dynamic doxastic logic to specify trace invariants, and provide simulations illustrating cascade suppression, auditability, and robustness-liveness trade-offs.

cs.AI↗
arXiv2026

Anon: Extrapolating Adaptivity Beyond SGD and Adam

Adaptive optimizers such as Adam and non-adaptive methods like SGD exhibit distinct generalization capabilities across different architectures. Prior tunable optimizers attempt to bridge this gap by strictly interpolating between SGD and Adam, effectively confining adaptivity within the 0-to-1 bound. However, this restricted interpolation is fundamentally insufficient: we reveal that optimal adaptivity often requires extrapolation, such as negative adaptivity for classical CNNs and adaptivity of at least one ($γ\geq 1$) for Transformers. Extrapolating adaptivity theoretically violates the strict non-decreasing pre-conditioner assumption, often leading to divergence in existing methods. To break this barrier, we propose Anon, an optimizer that achieves fully continuous adaptivity extrapolation across the entire real-number spectrum. To guarantee provable stability in these out-of-bound regimes, we introduce Incremental Delay Update (IDU), a novel mechanism that bypasses hard max-tracking strategies. We theoretically establish Anon's convergence in both convex and non-convex settings. Empirically, by exploring previously unreachable adaptivity landscapes, Anon demonstrates highly competitive and scalable performance among state-of-the-art element-wise optimizers on representative image classification, diffusion, and large language modeling tasks.

cs.AI↗