Search arXivSearch

arXiv · cs/0307006

BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games

Abstract

We present BL-WoLF, a framework for learnability in repeated zero-sum games where the cost of learning is measured by the losses the learning agent accrues (rather than the number of rounds). The game is adversarially chosen from some family that the learner knows. The opponent knows the game and the learner's learning strategy. The learner tries to either not accrue losses, or to quickly learn about the game so as to avoid future losses (this is consistent with the Win or Learn Fast (WoLF) principle; BL stands for ``bounded loss''). Our framework allows for both probabilistic and approximate learning. The resultant notion of {\em BL-WoLF}-learnability can be applied to any class of games, and allows us to measure the inherent disadvantage to a player that does not know which game in the class it is in. We present {\em guaranteed BL-WoLF-learnability} results for families of games with deterministic payoffs and families of games with stochastic payoffs. We demonstrate that these families are {\em guaranteed approximately BL-WoLF-learnable} with lower cost. We then demonstrate families of games (both stochastic and deterministic) that are not guaranteed BL-WoLF-learnable. We show that those families, nevertheless, are {\em BL-WoLF-learnable}. To prove these results, we use a key lemma which we derive.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

BibTeXRIS

Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm. 2003-07-03. BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games. https://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0307006

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

MMS Allocation for Chores with Online Agent Arrivals

We study the fair allocation of $m$ indivisible chores to $n$ agents with subadditive cost functions arriving online in an arbitrary order. Upon an agent's arrival, we are informed of her cost function and must irrevocably assign her a set of chores. We focus on the Maximin Share (MMS) fairness notion and aim to compute an allocation in which all items are assigned, and no agent incurs a cost more than $\alpha$ times her MMS. Without any prior information about the instance (other than $n$ and $m$), we design an algorithm with a competitive ratio of $O(\min\{n, k\log^{1+\epsilon}k, \log m\})$ for any constant $\epsilon > 0$, where $k$ denotes the number of cost function types. Our bound matches the best known offline approximation guarantees for MMS under subadditive costs and is nearly optimal with respect to all three parameters: we show that even for binary additive cost functions, no online algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio of $o(\min\{n, k\log k, \log m\})$. We then consider the setting in which the $k$ cost function types are known in advance (though the realized types of arriving agents are not). For additive cost functions, we provide an algorithm with a competitive ratio of $O(\min\{\log k, \log(kn)/\log\log(kn)\})$, and show that constant-competitive algorithms do not exist for general $k$, even for the binary additive setting. For binary additive functions when $k \le n$, we propose a $3$-competitive algorithm and establish a lower bound of $2$.

cs.GT

Truncated Noisy Best-Response Algorithms: Toward Game Theoretic Learning with Safety Guarantees

We consider a game theoretic approach to solve multi-agent coordination problems with submodular maximization objectives. It is known for such problems that the Nash equilibria for the corresponding game are always within 50% of the optimal, but that the equilibria which achieve this worst-case bound are not stable. To exploit this instability, we propose a family of algorithms which we call Truncated Noisy Best-Response (TNBR) Algorithms. These algorithms are flexibly characterized by agents asynchronously and stochastically selecting actions from a neighbourhood of their best response payoffs. We compute bounds on the recurrent classes of TNBR algorithms' associated Markov chains. Our bounds fall into two categories: first, "Performance" bounds ensure that TNBR algorithms always have a high-value recurrent state; second, "Safety" bounds ensure that TNBR algorithms never have arbitrarily-bad recurrent states. Furthermore, these two types of bounds are linked by a waterbed-like effect: every game with a poor Safety guarantee necessarily has a favorable Performance guarantee.

cs.GT

Existence of the Core in Approval-Based Committee Elections

We settle the main open question in the theory of approval-based multi-winner elections: we show that there always exists a committee in the core. The core is a stability and group fairness concept. The proof introduces a new voting rule that optimizes an entropy-like objective function over committees and payment systems. All local optima of this objective function lie in the core, which implies that a core committee can be found in polynomial time.

cs.GT