Efficient Hardware Information-Flow Tracking for Pre-Silicon Security Testing
Register-Transfer Level (RTL) simulation is widely used to test hardware before it is fabricated. To allow testing for security related information flow properties, such as confidentiality and integrity, taint logic can be automatically added to the design to track how information flows through it. However, taint logic instrumented by the state-of-the-art, such as CellIFT, makes simulation-based testing prohibitively expensive: On our evaluation of Mega-BOOM (136K cells), it increases the instrumented design to 5.81x the original cell count and causes a 143.72x simulation slowdown. The taint logic could be simplified to improve simulation speed, but it will inevitably trade off its precision. This lightweight, imprecise taint logic will introduce false positives and may eventually result in even more overhead to check these false positives. This paper explores the research question of where precision is actually needed in the design to overcome the overhead of false positives. It presents CEGAR-T, a framework that automatically synthesizes taint logic that minimizes the taint-logic instrumentation overhead while guaranteeing no false positives (relative to the precise CellIFT baseline). We have implemented CEGAR-T and evaluated it on the safe instruction set problem for timing side-channel security across open-source RISC-V cores. Over all evaluated cores, CEGAR-T reduces both instrumentation and simulation overhead, in geometric-mean, from 5.64x to 1.42x and from 34.65x to 1.79x, respectively, without compromising the precision benefit of the CellIFT baseline.