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arXiv · 2608.27910

AI Alignment through a Game-theoretic Lens: A Survey

Yanan Cai·Zhongrui Zhao·Zhigang Lu·Ickjai Lee·Wei Emma Zhang·Minhui Xue·Yihong Zhang·Shuchao Pang·Wei Xiang
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Abstract

As large language models and increasingly capable AI agents are deployed in high-risk settings, aligning them with complex human values has become a central challenge. Existing alignment methods, while effective in improving helpfulness, harmlessness, and controllability, often struggle to capture real-world preferences that are context-dependent, non-transitive, and shaped by dynamic multi-party interactions. This survey reviews AI alignment through a game-theoretic lens. Specifically, it organizes recent progress around key game-theoretic elements and synthesizes the literature along three challenges: preference diversity, alignment priority, and temporal dynamics. This perspective clarifies where current alignment methods genuinely benefit from game-theoretic analysis, where the framework is looser, and what challenges remain in building robust, adaptive, and verifiable AI systems.

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Yanan Cai, Zhongrui Zhao, Zhigang Lu, Ickjai Lee, Wei Emma Zhang, Minhui Xue, Yihong Zhang, Shuchao Pang, Wei Xiang. 2026-09-01. AI Alignment through a Game-theoretic Lens: A Survey. https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.27910

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